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ABSTRACT 
The risk profile of a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project affects its debt service ability. In particular, the 
total risk profile of an oil and gas project is heavily influenced by its environmental risk exposure. However, 
this risk is often not given a considerable weight in risk analysis, resulting in underestimation of project’s 
total riskiness and consequent overestimation of the debt capacity. This study is aimed at understanding the 
dependence  of  the  capital  structure  of  oil  and  gas  BOT  projects  on  environmental  risk  exposure  and 
proposes a methodology for incorporating such important risk into the total risk rating process to determine 
the debt leverage. As a result, it is shown that integrating environmental risks into the risk score of a project 
yields higher values of risk exposure, which may lead to a lower debt-to-equity ratio. 
 
Keywords: Environmental Risk, Oil and Gas, Project Financing, Project Management, Risk Assessment, 
Risk Rating 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Project  Financing  (PF)  has  emerged  as  a  distinct 
way of funding large international high risk projects and 
has  undergone  a  drastic  growth  over  the  last  decades. 
Under  the  terms  of  a  PF  mechanism,  one  or  more 
investors join a separate legal entity, often called Special 
Purpose Vehicle (SPV), to finance design, construction, 
operations  and  maintenance  of  an  infrastructure  for  a 
specified  government-granted  concession  period.  The 
initial investment, funded by means of both equity and 
debt  sources,  is  intended  to  be  recovered  through 
revenues  from  the  service  provided  during  the 
concession  period,  which  is  determined  to  sufficiently 
pay off the debt incurred and earn an acceptable profit 
from  the  project  cash  flows  (Zhang,  2009).  This 
mechanism  is  often  termed  as  a  Build-Operate  and 
Transfer  (BOT)  form  of  contract  to  develop  a  Public-
Private Partnership (PPP). 
  Construction projects are highly exposed to a variety 
or  risks.  Moreover,  risk  plays  an  important  role  in 
defining the capital structure of a PF venture. On the one 
hand,  PF  characterizes  itself  as  a  contracting  and 
financing mechanism for facilitating equity investments 
into risky projects because it avoids or limits lenders to 
recur  for  repayment  of  their  loans  against  the  equity 
shareholders  (Finnerty,  2007).  On  the  other  hand,  the 
higher the risk, the lower the debt capacity of a project as 
a  result  of  the  reduced  ability  of  a  project  to  match 
financial covenants and, in particular, to meet the target 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR). In fact, in high 
risk projects high interest rates are charged and reduced 
amount  of  loans  are  offered  by  lending  institutions  so 
that a higher target DSCR is assured to minimize the bank’s 
risk-adverse commitment to the project. In other words, the 
amount of risks and the way such risks are being managed 
by the SPV impacts the project’s capital structure, which is 
referred to as the level of equity and debt sources of funds 
required to cover the total initial investment. 
  Overall, the PF/BOT system has been being largely 
used to finance oil and gas infrastructure investments in 
many  countries.  Oil  and  gas  projects  typically  require Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1): 97-106, 2013 
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large capitals with rather high level of risk to develop 
either  upstream  operations  facilities,  such  as  oil  wells 
and  offshore  platforms,  or  downstream  operations 
infrastructures,  such  as  gas  processing  plants,  oil 
refineries  and  pipelines.  Oil  and  gas  projects  usually 
incur various risks, namely political, financial, revenue, 
construction and operations risks, which are quite similar 
to most risks faced by many types of projects in various 
industries. In addition, a distinctive risk that usually has 
a  very  high  impact  on  oil  and  gas  projects  is  the 
environmental  risk,  due  to  the  inherent  nature  of 
petroleum  operations  to  impact  on  the  natural  and 
human  environment.  The  primary  importance  of 
environmental risk for oil and gas projects is testified 
by the amount of reported stories of oil spills, coastal 
degradation and communities concerns that often result 
in significant damages and economic losses suffered by 
the vehicle companies. 
  However, the environmental risk is often not given a 
considerable weight in analyzing the risk involved in a 
BOT  project,  resulting  in  an  underestimation  of  the 
project’s  total  riskiness  and,  in  turn,  in  a  potentially 
unbalanced capital structure. 
  A  significant stream of literature is in the area of 
risk  analysis  and,  in  particular,  on  the  relationship  of 
project risk rating with the capital structure of a PF/BOT 
project  (Baccarini  and  Archer,  2001).  However,  very 
little work seems to address the way that environmental 
risks  affect  the  risk  profile  of  a  PF/BOT  system 
(Grimsey  and  Lewis,  2002)  in  order  to  design  an 
appropriate  capital  structure  for  an  infrastructure 
investment. To overcome this research gap, the purpose 
of  this  research  is  to  explore  the  dependence  of  the 
capital structure of PF/BOT projects on environmental 
risk  exposure  and  to  propose  a  methodology  for 
capturing environmental risk into the total risk profile of 
an oil and gas project and estimating its influence on the 
debt leverage.  
  The study is developed as follows. First, we give the 
literature  review.  Then,  we  present  the  methodology, 
followed by its application and validation on two case 
demonstration projects. Finally,  we discuss results and 
draw conclusions together with implications and future 
research directions. 
1.1. Literature Review 
  Previous relevant studies to understand the impact of 
environmental risk on the capital structure of PF/BOT oil 
and  gas  projects  can  be  subsumed  into  two  main 
connected areas of management research. 
  The first research area is related to identifying and 
rating  anticipated  risks  of  a  PF/BOT  project.  It  is 
commonly accepted in the project management literature 
that  risk  management  is  a  central  process  requiring 
identification of various types of risks and assessment of 
the potential consequences and probability of occurrence 
of identified hazards (PMI, 2009; APM, 2004). 
  In  particular,  for  the  purpose  of  this  study,  the 
identification of risks that might have an impact on the 
financial structure of a PF/BOT infrastructure project is 
of crucial importance (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005) and 
various  papers  are  available  to  identify  the  major  risk 
categories, such as political, economic, financial, design, 
construction, supply, operating, revenue, force majeure 
and  various  other  risks  (Grimsey  and  Lewis,  2002; 
Svanikier,  2008;  Marco  et  al.,  2012).  Some  authors 
explicitly recognize environmental risk as a major source 
of hazard in PPP projects (Zhang, 2005b; Bing et al., 
2005). Iyer and Sagheer (2010) describe environmental 
risks  as  those  due  to  environmental  impact  liability, 
public protests and litigation by environmental activists 
that  may  occur  during  the  construction  and  operation 
phases of the project. With specific regard to oil and gas 
projects, environmental risk is also referred to as oil and 
gas flaring, water pollution, threats to biodiversity with 
resulting  compensation  and  restoration  of  livelihoods 
(Davis,  2003;  Horta,  2007).  From  a  financial  point  of 
view, environmental risk in oil and gas projects is seen 
as  primarily  related  to  potential  changes  to 
environmental regulations that could erode the project's 
credit stance and impact on the project cash flow. 
  As stated above, the risk rating of a PF/BOT project 
is a fundamental precursor to design the capital structure 
because  it  contributes  to  determining  both  the  debt 
leverage and the interest rates on debt capital. Risk rating 
is usually determined through either qualitative or semi-
quantitative  assessment  of  the  combination  of  the 
probability of occurrence and impact of identified risks 
(PMI, 2009). The qualitative assessment is performed via 
range of nonnumeric notions (i.e., high, medium and low 
likelihood; catastrophic, medium and negligible impact), 
while semi-quantitative analysis can be defined when a 
scale factor is associated to nonnumeric ranking. Some 
researchers propose methods to rate the risk profile of a 
PPP  project.  Schaufelberger  and  Wipadapisut  (2003) 
recommend a score from 1 to 5 for assessing political, 
financial and market risk of BOT projects, with 5 being 
very  high  risk,.  They  also  provide  evidence  of  the 
relationship  between  the  risk  profile  and  the  equity  to Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1): 97-106, 2013 
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debt ratio of several projects under consideration. The 
same 1 to 5 scale is used by Baccarini and Archer (2001) 
to  rank  risk  factors  affecting  project  performance.  We 
suggest using a 10 to 100 score for risk exposure of a 
project in different risk categories, with 100 being the 
most  exposed.  Standard  and  Poor’s  2001  use  a 
benchmark  score  of  1  to  riskiest  10  when  grading 
projects:  generally,  projects  with  score  of  1  to  5  are 
investment-grade,  while  a  score  of  5  to  10  indicates 
speculative projects. Finally, Zayed et al. (2008) introduce a 
consistent  procedure  for  assessing  BOT  project  risks 
through the definition of a risk index and project ranking 
methodology using the analytic hierarchy process based on 
actual performance of eight main risk areas, i.e., political, 
financial, revenue, promoting, procurement, development, 
construction and operations risks. 
  Although environmental risk is paid attention in the 
risk  identification  literature,  it  seems  that  very  little 
consideration  is  given  to  environmental  risk  by  both 
scholarly and trade literature when rating the total risk 
profile  of  a  BOT  project.  Claiming  for  the  need  of 
considering  environmental  risk  into  risk  rating  of  PPP 
projects,  the  Equator  Principles  Financial  Institutions 
(EPFIs, 2006) provide principles to ensure that projects 
are developed in a manner that are socially responsible 
and reflect sound environmental management practices and 
propose to rank projects into three categories, namely: (A) 
projects  with  potential  significant  adverse  environmental 
impacts that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented; (B) 
projects  with  potential  limited  adverse  environmental 
impacts and (C) projects with minimal or no environmental 
impacts. In conclusion, EPFIs tend to reject loans to A-class 
projects and limit loans to B-class projects. 
  The second pertinent area of management research 
is  committed  to  develop  suitable  methodologies  to 
optimize  the  PF  capital  structure  and,  in  particular,  to 
define the debt leverage via financial covenants like the 
DSCR.  In  fact,  professional  practice  and  previous 
research  have  found  evidence  that  the  DSCR,  which 
reflects the project’s debt carrying ability, is the lender’s 
most sound indicator for establishing the debt leverage 
(Bakatjan  et  al.,  2003).  DSCR  is  referred  to  as  the 
amount  of  cash  flow  available  to  meet  annual  interest 
and principal payments on debt, including any sinking 
fund payments and it is computed as the ratio between 
operating cash flow and debt service during a one-year 
period (Esty, 2004). Generally, the DSCR should be at 
least equal to or greater than 1.0 to be acceptable, but 
lending  agencies  actually  demand  higher  and  a  more 
comfortable  target  DSCR  up  to  1.5,  according  to  the 
anticipated risk exposure (Zhang, 2005a). In other words, 
the target DSCR is set at high levels whenever a high 
risk score is assessed for the project. 
  In  summary,  even  though  risk  is  affirmed  to  be 
central in the definition of the DSCR and, in turn, of the 
optimal  capital  structure  and  risk  taxonomies  are 
provided  that  contemplate  environmental  risk,  little 
previous work is reported with focus on the influence of 
environmental risk on the PF capital structure. Also, it 
seems that environmental risk is not fully considered in 
the total risk assessment procedure used by lending and 
rating institutions. However, environmental risk might be 
of great impact particularly for oil and gas projects.  
  To  overcome  this  limitation  and  understand  the 
extent to which environmental risk might influence the 
PF capital structure, in the next sections we develop a 
methodology  that  integrates  environmental  risk  into 
project rating and capital structuring and we provide its 
application  and  measurement  to  two  oil  and  gas 
demonstration projects. 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
  The  proposed  methodology  comprises  four  main 
steps,  namely:  (1)  identification  and  semi-quantitative 
rating  of  the  project’s  total  risk  exposure;  (2) 
determination of the appropriate interest rate through the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); (3) calculation of 
the DSCR and (4) estimation of project’s debt-to-equity 
ratio. Figure 1 depicts the process flow for determining 
the debt leverage and shows how the computation of the 
DSCR  and  debt  leverage  are  iterative  until  the  final 
satisfactory debt service ability is obtained.  
2.1. Step 1. Risk Identification and Rating 
  Step Based on models available in the literature to 
classify  risks  in  PPP  contracts  (Schaufelberger  and 
Wipadapisut 2003; Xenidis and Angelides, 2005; Zhang 
2005b;  Iyer  and  Sagheer,  2010),  typical  risks  inherent 
with oil and gas BOT projects, including environmental 
risk,  are  identified  using  a  Risk  Breakdown  Structure 
(RBS) (PMI, 2009), like the one presented in Fig. 2. 
  Identified  risks  are  then  assessed  their  impact  of 
consequences  and  likelihood  of  occurrence.  A 
semiquantitative  risk  analysis  is  used  by  assigning 
numerical  scores  to  nonnumeric  definitions  of  each  of 
these  constituents,  as  shown  in  Table  1  and  2.  In 
particular,  a  scale  from  1  to  5  is  assigned  to  the 
probability of risk events and a grading from 1 to 10 is 
applied for evaluating the impact of consequences.  Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1): 97-106, 2013 
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Fig. 1. Methodology flow chart 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Proposed risk breakdown structure for an oil and gas BOT project 
 
Table 1. Likelihood scores 
Score  Description 
1  Very low-almost never happened in industry 
2  Low-happens rarely 
3  Medium 
4  High-likely to happen 
5  Very high-almost certain to happen 
 
Table 2. Impact scores 
Score  Description 
0-2  Insignificant 
3-4  Minor 
5-6  Moderate 
7-8  Major 
9-10  Catastrophic 
Table 3. Risk  categories  weight  without  incorporation  of 
environmental risk 
Risk category  Weight 
Technical (Technology,  
construction and operational)  0.20 
Business (Market and revenue)  0.25 
Financial  0.35 
External  0.20 
 
A  committee  of  experts  is  recommended  to  make  the 
grading  in  order  to  limit  subjective  preference  and 
individual’s judgment (Zayed and Chang, 2002). 
  The weight of each risk category is then determined. 
The  weight of a  group of risks reflects its importance 
relative  to  the  other  categories,  irrespective  of  any 
particular project.  Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1): 97-106, 2013 
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Table 4. Risk categories weight with incorporation of environmental risk 
Risk category  Weight  Description 
Technical  0.17  In petroleum industry it is typical to conduct operations in remote areas and offshore; 
harsh conditions may present great risk despite possible mitigation measures, therefore, the 
weight of this risk group is higher than of Financial risks that are relatively easy to be 
managed, but lower than of Business, External and Environmental. 
Business  0.20  Business risk group which comprise P reinvestment and Market risks has a higher eight 
than Financial and Technical risk groups, because of the peculiarity of the industry: high 
volatility of prices and commodity risk. An approximate cost of conducting a 3D seismic 
survey is millions of dollars, yet it does not guarantee the presence of oil for 100%. 
Financial  0.13  Financial markets have learnt to manage such risks better than others; therefore, the weight 
is the lowest. 
Environmental  0.30  Each step of petroleum operations have an adverse effect on environment, therefore,  
/Social    the importance of this risk group is the highest relative to other groups. 
Environmental  0.5   
Accidental   0.3   Accidental risks have greater impact than cumulative when they occur, but people are 
aware of such risks and are able to manage them. 
Cumulative  0.7  Cumulative risks occurrence is almost certain; their impact is observed in long-term, 
usually not taken seriously. 
Social  0.5   
External   0.20   Force majeure risks cannot be managed by any party, politics play a significant role in 
petroleum industry and thus the weight is the same as for Business risk group. 
 
In general, the choice of the risk weight is quite subjective 
and  relies  on  the  principle  that  the  better  the  hedging 
methods available for avoiding or mitigating the effects of a 
certain risk in the market/industry, the lower their influence 
on the risk profile yielding in a lower relative weight. With 
this  principle  in  mind  and  based  on  practices  from 
international rating agencies we propose a weighing system 
for  identified  risk  categories  experienced  in  oil  and  gas 
BOT projects (Table 3). 
  This  weighing  method  does  not  consider 
environmental  risks.  To  overcome  this  limitation  and 
adjust  the  weights  to  the  suggested  RBS  presented  in 
Figure  2,  we  propose  a  derivative  weighing  system, 
which  incorporates  environmental  risks.  The  complete 
weighing  system  is  presented  in  Table  4  with 
justification of relative weight assigned to each category.  
  The  two  case  scenarios,  namely  (a)  with 
incorporation  of  environmental  risk  and  (b)  without 
considering environmental risk, can now be compared. 
The computation of the project’s exposure to all risks, 
i.e.: the project risk s, is proposed as follows. 
  The exposure 
ne
i R of any group of risks, except for the 
environmental group, is calculated through Equation 1: 
 
ne
i R L*I =   (1) 
 
  Regarding  the  risk  exposure  of  the  environmental 
risk  group 
e
i R ,  a  modified  Equation  2  is  used  it  to 
account  for  the  community  risk  perception,  which 
weighs  the  impact  factor  more  than  the  likelihood 
(Carpignano et al., 2009): 
e k
i R L*I =   (2) 
 
where, k>1; for instance, in more community-sensitive 
countries k might equal 2.0 to stress the importance of 
the adverse impact of risk. 
  Burgman  (2005)  states  that  risk  can  be 
underestimated by the risk proponents and overestimated 
by  those  dealing  with  the  consequences.  Nevertheless, 
the degradation of ecosystems due to petroleum operations 
is  taking  place  on  a  global  scale  and  environmental 
awareness  is  arising,  thus  increasing  community’s 
susceptibility to possible adverse effects. This is why it is 
proposed  to  weigh  the  impact  from  environmental  risk 
more than impacts from other risk groups. 
  For the sake of simplicity, only the first level risks 
of  the  RBS  are  being  considered,  except  for  the 
environmental risks, where both second and third levels 
are taken into account (Table 4). 
  Finally,  the  total  risk  rating  R  of  the  project  is 
computed as the summation of each risk group exposure 
Ri  times  the  correspondent  weight  Wi,  as  given  in 
Equation 3: 
 
i i R R *W =∑   (3) 
2.2. Step 2. Interest Rate Calculation 
  There are a number of factors that might affect the 
interest rate on loans for a PPP project. Firstly, interest 
rates are strongly influenced by the overall condition of a Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1): 97-106, 2013 
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country’s economy. When the economy is growing, the 
consumers’  demand  for  goods  increases  leading  to 
increase in demand for funds and interest rate rise and 
viceversa.  Inflation  also  affects  interest  rates  to 
compensate  lenders  for  the  decreased  future  value  of 
money.  Taxes  may  also  be  a  reason  for  higher  rates 
because some of the gains from interest may be subject 
to taxes and the lender  may insist on a higher rate to 
make  up  for  this  loss.  As  anticipated  earlier  into  this 
study, another factor affecting interest rates is the risk 
profile of the project: the riskier the project, the higher 
the  rate  offered  by  lending  institutions.  To  prove  this 
relationship the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is 
applied  in  our  methodology.  Some  important 
assumptions are made prior using the model.  
  First  of  all,  theoretically,  CAPM  is  used  when 
defining the cost of capital of a firm, not a single project. 
Application  of  CAPM  in  calculating  the  interest  rate 
offered for a project could be justified by the fact that, as 
the  analyzed  projects  were  financed  by  means  of  PF, 
they  were  developed  by  SPV  companies  created 
exclusively  for  the  purpose  of  this  project.  Thus,  the 
CAPM  in  PF  could  be  used  directly  to  identify  the 
expected rate of return of a project. 
  The CAPM states that the equilibrium rate of return 
of an asset, or a project, is function of the relative risk 
level when compared to the market portfolio and can be 
computed with Equation 4: 
 
i f i m f E(r ) r *[E(r ) r ] = +b -   (4) 
 
where, E(ri) is the expected return of the project; rf the 
risk-free  interest  rate  at  the  same  period,  such  as  a 
government bond or Treasury bill rates; E(rm) the expected 
return of the market, with the S&P500 index widely used as 
a  benchmark;  [E(rm)-rf]  the  excess  rate  of  return  on  the 
market portfolio; the product ßi* [E(rm)-rf] indicates the risk 
premium;  and  βi  the  systematic  risk  of  the  project.  In 
classical theory, an asset that has β > 1 is more sensitive to 
market  movements  than  the  market  portfolio,  thus  more 
risky and should provide greater returns than the expected 
return on the market portfolio. Similarly, an asset with β < 1 
is less risky than the market portfolio). 
  Now, because data for extrapolating  β of a  single 
project are not available, we propose to use Equation 5 to 
calculate the project beta: 
 
R/100 1 b = +   (5) 
 
where, R is the overall project risk rating. 
  This formula is used for the purpose of this study 
when  analyzing  oil  and  gas  projects.  As  one  can 
conclude, oil and gas projects would thus be riskier than 
the overall PPP infrastructure market, as values of beta 
calculated with such formula are be greater than 1.0. 
  Obviously, the calculated values of risk rating affect 
the value of beta, which has, in turn, an impact on the 
debt  interest  rate;  it  is  expected  that  greater  values  of 
beta yield higher interest rate. 
2.3. Step 3. DSCR Calculation 
  After determining the risk exposure and the interest 
rate,  it  is  possible  to  compute  the  DSCRy  in  any  one 
single year of operations, using Equation 6: 
 
Y y y DSCR netcashflow / (principal interest) = +   (6) 
 
  The  amount  of  debt  the  project  is  able  to  service 
depends on the annual net cash flow generated by the 
project operations, the debt principal to be reimbursed 
and  the  interest  charged  by  the  banks’  pool.  The 
minimum DSCR in the worst-case year must be greater 
than the target DSCR imposed by lending institutions. 
The target DSCR is a function of the estimated project’s 
total risk score. 
2.4. Step 4. Estimation of the Debt Leverage 
  Finally, the capital structure is defined according to 
the bank’s requirements of targeting DSCR values. The 
impact  of  the  risk  rating  on  the  DSCR  occurs  in  two 
ways: on the one hand, the higher the risk, the greater the 
interest rate offered by the bank and, thus, for a given 
amount of cash flow and debt, lower values of DSCR are 
obtained.  On  the  other  hand,  as  banks  are  risk  averse 
organizations,  they  tend  to  increase  their  target 
requirements on the DSCR in case the debt risk exposure 
is  high.  Thus,  there  are  low  chances  of  matching  the 
required financial covenants. 
  There are two possible solutions when the resulting 
DSCR falls below the target established by the bank as a 
function of the risk assessed. A first solution provides for 
lending institutions to decrease the loan amount, so that 
the  capital  structure  would  result  in  a  lower  debt-to-
equity ratio. 
 
Table 5. Select parameters for the demonstration projects 
  Project #1    Project #2 
  -----------------------  ----------------------------- 
  Case (a)  (b)  (a)  (b) 
Environmental  40.88  -  70.13  - 
risk exposure 
Project total  54.68  18.1  85.64  21.35 
risk rating 
Annual  8.15%  7.24%  8.92%  7.32% 
interest rate 
Minimum DSCR  4.21  4.22  1.29  2.11 Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1): 97-106, 2013 
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Table 6. Project#1 cash flow data 
Debt 
thous.  1,450,000 
USD 
Cash  
flow 
thous.  317,481  384,765  389,154  366,575  401,552  398,211  433,477  435,267  438,118  373,182  371,469  378,471  387,428  328,978  358,441  391,545  383,528  382,868  327,531  308,024 
USD 
Case a)   
year    1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
principal  ($71,  ($71,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($73,  ($73, 
  940)  999)  058)  116)  175)  234)  293)  352)  411)  470)  529)  588)  647)  706)  766)  825)  884)  944)  003)  063) 
Interest  ($1,182)  ($1,123) ($1,065)  ($1,006)  ($947)  ($888)  ($829)  ($770)  ($711)  ($652)  ($593)  ($534)  ($475)  ($416)  ($357)  ($297)  ($238)  ($179)  ($119)  ($60) 
Σ  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,   ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73, 
  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122)  122) 
DSCR  (4.34)  (5.26)  (5.32)  (5.01)  (5.49)  (5.45)  (5.93)  (5.95)  (5.99)  (5.10)  (5.08)  (5.18)  (5.30)  (4.50)  (4.90)  (5.35)  (5.25)  (5.24)  (4.48)  (4.21) 
Case b) 
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
principal ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($72,  ($73, 
  003)  055)  107)  159)  211)  264)  316)  368)  421)  473)  526)  578)  631)  683)  736)  789)  841)  894)  947)  000) 
Interest  ($1,050)  ($998)  ($946)  ($893)  ($841)  ($789)  ($737)  ($684)  ($632)  ($579)  ($527)  ($474)  ($422)  ($369)  ($317)  ($264)  ($211)  ($158)  ($106)  ($53) 
Σ  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73,  ($73, 
  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052)  052) 
DSCR  (4.35)  (5.27)  (5.33)  (5.02)  (5.50)  (5.45)  (5.93)  (5.96)  (6.00)  (5.11)  (5.08)  (5.18)  (5.30)  (4.50)  (4.91)  (5.36)  (5.25)  (5.24)  (4.48)  (4.22) 
 
Table 7. Project #2 cash flow data 
Debt 
thous.   1,400,000 
USD 
Cash  
flow 
thous.  433,000  894,000  1,007,000  1,002,000  1,024,000  1,019,000  826,000  642,000  470,000  376,000  324,000  281,000  244,000  212,000 
USD 
Case a) 
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Principal  ($54,109)  ($58,937)  ($64,195)  ($69,923)  ($76,162)  ($82,957)  ($90,359)  ($98,421)  ($107,202)  ($116,767)  ($127,185)  ($138,533)  ($150,894)  ($164,357) 
Interest  ($1,249)  ($1,160)  ($1,072)  ($983)  ($894)  ($805)  ($716)  ($627)  ($537)  ($448)  ($358)  ($269)  ($179)  ($90) 
Σ  ($55,358)  ($60,097)  ($65,267)  ($70,906)  ($77,055)  ($83,762)  ($91,074)  ($99,047)  ($107,739)  ($117,215)  ($127,544)  ($138,802)  ($151,073)  ($164,447) 
DSCR  (7.82)  (14.88)  (15.43)  (14.13)  (13.29)  (12.17)  (9.07)  (6.48)  (4.36)  (3.21)  (2.54)  (2.02)  (1.62)  (1.29) 
Case b) 
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Principal  ($99,525)  ($99,598)  ($99,671)  ($99,744)  ($99,817)  ($99,890)  ($99,963)  ($100,036)  ($100,109)  ($100,183)  ($100,256)  ($100,329)  ($100,403)   ($100,476) 
Interest  ($1,025)  ($952)  ($879)  ($806)  ($733)  ($660)  ($587)  ($514)  ($441)  ($367)  ($294)  ($221)  ($147)  ($74) 
Σ  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550)  ($100,550) 
DSCR  (4.31)  (8.89)  (10.01)  (9.97)  (10.18)  (10.13)  (8.21)  (6.38)  (4.67)  (3.74)  (3.22)  (2.79)  (2.43)  (2.11) 
 
However, the SPV’s sponsors usually seek to maximize 
the debt leverage of the project in order to minimize their 
equity participation in the project and associated risk, to 
maximize the internal rate of return to equity and to allocate 
limited money in multiple projects (Zhang, 2005b). Thus, a 
second  option  suggests  that  project  promoters  take 
preventive risk mitigating actions to lower the risk exposure 
of the project in order to obtain less interest rate and to take 
advantage of larger loan amounts. 
2.5. Application 
  For  the  purpose  of  validating  and  proving  the 
viability  of  the  proposed  methodology,  we  apply  it  to 
two oil and gas BOT projects, whose names and location 
cannot  be  disclosed  for  confidentiality  reasons.  The 
projects under consideration are real past ventures used 
here  as  a  demonstration.  Project  #1  comprises  design, 
construction and operations of an oil field development, 
a  pipeline  system  and  downstream  facilities. 
Environmental risks borne by Project #1 are mainly air 
emissions  and  oil  spills;  these  are  amplified  by  the 
specific  properties  of  the  hydrocarbons  such  as  high 
concentration of sulphur and metals, particularly nickel 
and  vanadium.  Their  processing  implies  a  coke  and 
sulphur generation, as well as a large amount of effluents 
and emissions to the atmosphere. Pipelines are laid under 
the  sea,  thus,  discharges  of  oil  and  chemicals  have 
various  lethal  and  non-lethal  effects  on  maritime 
wildlife. Moreover, the onshore part of the pipeline is 
laid  underground  which  demands  for  a  considerable 
earth disruption. 
  Project  #2  consists  of  two  components:  a  field 
system  comprising  drilling  of  wells  to  extract  oil,  a 
treatment facility to upgrade oil, an operating center for 
production support; and an export system which entails a 
pipeline  from  the  oil  fields  to  a  floating  storage,  an 
offloading  vessel  located  offshore  and  a  monitoring 
system  to  detect  potential  oil  leaks.  Project  #2  is 
executed in a sensitive area consisting of a number of 
rivers, habitat zones where rare plants and endangered 
species  live  and  a  delicate  marine  environment; 
moreover, the pipeline crosses a huge littoral forest zone. 
Thus, environmental risks such as oil spills, deforestation 
and degradation of coastal reef are encountered by the 
construction  and  operations  activities;  air  pollution  is Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1): 97-106, 2013 
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also a concern. It must be noted that the probability of 
these risks to occur and, consequently, the possible impact 
on the environment and people, is very high and in some 
cases almost inevitable due to the peculiarities of politics 
and attitude of different parties executing the project. 
  It is expected that higher risk exposure would lead to 
lower minimum DSCR, all other components remaining 
equal. This would indicate the inability of a project to 
service its debt in case the minimum DSCR falls below 
the target DSCR imposed by the bank. 
  Cash flow data used for DSCR computations of both 
projects are reported in Table 6 and 7. 
3. RESULTS 
  Table 5 is a summary report of the two projects’ 
risk  score,  annual  interest  rate  and  minimum  DSCR 
figures. We calculated all parameters using the steps of 
the proposed methodology and under both case scenarios 
above,  namely:  (a)  with  environmental  risk  rating;  (b) 
without considering environmental risk. 
  For both projects, an increased case (a) risk rating 
than case (b) is due to the incorporation of environmental 
risks  into  the  risk  assessment,  which,  theoretically, 
affects the capital structure of the project. However, a 
different impact of environmental risk exposure on the 
two proposed projects results in differing influence on 
the minimum DSCR. For project #1, which bears a low 
level of environmental risk  exposure, the difference is 
insignificant  and  clearly  does  not  increase  the  interest 
charged and, in turn, does not affect the capital structure 
of the project. 
  For  Project  #2,  the  difference  in  minimum  DSCR 
between the two cases is due to a high environmental 
risk  exposure  of  the  project.  In  particular,  the  project 
fails  to  meet  a  typical  1.5  target  DSCR  when 
environmental risk is added, while without the effect of 
environmental  considerations  the  project  cash  flow  is 
largely capable to bear the expected debt. Therefore, a 
lower debt-to-equity ratio must be determined. 
  In summary, the debt service ability of each project 
depends  on  the  level  of  risk  exposure  borne  by 
associated performed construction and operations: here, 
project  #2  has  much  greater  potential  effect  on  the 
environment than project #1. For the same values of cash 
flow  and  debt,  the  minimum  DSCR  decreases  with 
increased risk exposure. The main reason is the increase 
in the interest rate, which in turn is the indicator of a 
bank’s willingness to provide financing to risky projects: 
the higher the risk, the higher the expected return. Also, 
if risk is not mitigated and the total risk profile is not 
improved, the debt leverage is likely to be reduced, thus 
leading to a higher equity level. 
  The  methodology  poses  some  limitations  inherent 
with its domain of application and level of profitability. 
As stated above, environmental risk is not just the only 
factor influencing the DSCR. Therefore, the advantages 
of the proposed methodology are maximized when it is 
applied  to  those  sectors  and  projects  characterized  by 
high environmental risks. In such cases, the difference in 
total  risk  exposure  would  be  more  significant  and  so 
would be its impact on the DSCR. 
  Also,  projects  with  non-maximized  debt  leverage 
may  be  insensitive  to  variations  in  the  DSCR  and, 
therefore, insensible to environmental risk exposure. For 
instance, project #1 expects to generate cash flows high 
enough to service even greater debt than established, so 
that  a  reduced  minimum  DSCR  does  not  have  much 
impact on the financial structure. 
4. DISCUSSION 
  The  preventive  actions  conducted  to  mitigate  the 
environmental  risk  exposure  are  likely  to  affect  the 
project’s capital structure in two ways. On the one hand, 
a lower environmental risk contributes to reducing the 
overall risk score of the project with subsequent reduced 
interest,  higher  minimum  DSCR,  lower  target  DSCR 
and,  in  turn,  higher  debt  leverage  and  reduced  equity 
contribution to the total investment. 
  On  the  other  hand,  the  costs  of  risk  mitigating 
actions  undertaken  during  the  design  and  construction 
periods  result  in  an  increased  initial  investment  either 
through increased equity, which leads to lower debt-to 
equity  ratio,  or  by  acquiring  more  debt,  if  the  project 
cash flow and minimum DSCR can justify. 
  Improved risk mitigation actions include, but are not 
limited  to,  implementation  of  more  advanced 
technologies, systems and processes that might lead to 
less negative impact on the environment and improved 
safety.  However,  because  huge  research  and 
development  (R&D)  efforts  are  usually  required  in 
relation  to  such  advancement  in  risk-preventive 
technologies  and  because  lending  institutions  are 
disinclined  to  finance  risky  and  unprofitable  R&D 
spending for environmental risk mitigating measures, it 
may be concluded that oil and gas companies have to 
fund  the  development  of  advanced  environmental 
technologies with owned equity sources. 
  At  a  first  glance,  such  scenario  might  seem 
unattractive  to  oil  and  gas  players.  Companies  are 
reluctant to invest much equity in the project due to the 
reasons discussed above.  Alberto De Marco and Bagilya Karsybayeva / American Journal of Applied Sciences, 10 (1): 97-106, 2013 
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  However,  the  situation  is  changing.  Besides 
traditional consequences from environmental risks such 
as  increased  operating  costs  and  penalties,  many 
emerging social and environmental pressures associated 
with  requirements  on  greenhouse  gas  emissions 
reduction,  boicott  campaigns  and  opposition  by 
environmentalists,  are  likely  to  increasingly  affect  oil 
and  gas  shareholders’  value,  project  risk  management 
policies  and  BOT/PF  options  (Wright  and 
Rwabizambuga,  2006).  Moreover,  the  ever  increasing 
significance  of  the  health,  safety  and  environment 
management  systems  has  been  leading  oil  and  gas 
contractors to place the implementation of such systems in 
their agenda. Therefore, both investing equity resources to 
sustain R&D investments to mitigate environmental risk 
and accounting for the impact of environmental risk into 
the  project  total  risk  rating  are  necessary  trends  to 
facilitate an appropriate debt leverage into BOT/PF oil and 
gas projects. The proposed methodology can help oil and 
gas companies in this process. 
  This  study  also  promises  applicability  to  other 
sectors and might be beneficially used as a template for 
an investigation in other infrastructure projects that are, 
to some extents, exposed to high environmental risks. To 
this end, future research should extend the validity of the 
methodology  beyond  the  oil  and  gas  context  and 
generalize  its  results  for  diffused  usage  by  lending 
institutions and concessionaires. 
5. CONCLUSION 
  In  the  current  practice  the  share  of  environmental 
risks in the assessment of the total risk profile of an oil 
and  gas  BOT/PF  project  is  often  underestimated. 
However, environmental risks pose a significant threat to 
the project financial viability. Thus, environmental risks 
must be given an appropriate weight when defining the 
risk profile of a project. To this end, this study proposes 
a methodology for incorporating environmental risks into 
the project total risk rating and for refining the process to 
determine the capital structure of a BOT/PF investment. 
  Through application to two case studies, it has been 
shown  that  higher  values  of  risk  exposure  due  to 
environmental  risks  lead  to  increased  interest  rates 
offered  by  lending  institutions,  decreased  debt  service 
ability  of  the  project’s  cash  flows  and,  as  a  result,  a 
lower debt leverage. It is also shown that low levered 
projects  may  be  not  affected  by  variations  of  the  risk 
score due to high environmental risk exposure. However, 
because  of  reduced  equity  availability,  the  capital 
structure of BOT/PF projects tends to maximize the debt 
leverage  and,  consequently,  be  highly  exposed  to  the 
consequences of environmental risks. 
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